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use the internet to some extent,1 and that trend appears to have remained on
the rise since the introduction of the world wide web on August 6, 1991.2
While the list of uses for this technology can seem as expansive as its user
base, there are several activities that are most popular with the American
people. Among these popular activities is, some would say unsurprisingly,
shopping.3
The rise of internet retail sales, also known as e-commerce, may be
a natural response to advancing technologies, but it also heralds a decline in
more traditional forms of retail. Specifically, physical storefronts, also
known as brick-and-mortar stores, have seen a decrease in traffic, which has
negative implications for sales tax revenue and the states that rely on it.4 As
traditional retail locations close their doors, tax revenue growth slows.5 In
order to combat these declining growth rates, states have begun seeking
alternatives to limit their dependence on the physical storefront. Ecommerce is one such alternative, which has the potential to bolster states’
tax revenue without running afoul of constitutional or market protections on
internet retail sales. However, taxing e-commerce raises a number of
complications—most notably, how far states may extend their taxing
authority to retailers who are not, either physically or functionally, contained
within the territorial bounds of the state. If states reach too far, they risk
running afoul of constitutional protections to interstate commerce and
hampering the very industry they seek to access. If they do not reach far
enough, states risk continued declines in sales tax revenue, upon which they
heavily rely. Ultimately, states must strive to strike a balance that captures
the benefits of e-commerce taxation while respecting the bounds of their own
authority and the needs of the industry.
In support of this conclusion, this note begins in Section I by
examining the shift toward e-commerce and its impact on state tax revenue.
Next, Section II explores internet retail jurisprudence and the inception and
dominion of the physical presence requirement. As of June 21, 2018,
however, that requirement has been laid to rest, and Section III addresses the
1. Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www.
pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/internet-broadband/.
2. Nick Carbone, Not So High-Tech Anymore: The First Website Ever Celebrates Its
20th Birthday, TIME (Aug. 6, 2011), http://newsfeed.time.com/2011/08/06/the-first-websiteever-celebrates-its-20th-birthday/.
3. Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, Online Shopping and E-Commerce, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/12/19/online-shoppingand-e-commerce/.
4. See Alana Semuels, All the Ways Retail’s Decline Could Hurt American Towns, THE
ATLANTIC (May 23, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/05/retail-sal
es-tax-revenue/527697/.
5. Id.
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outcome and effects of South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.6 Section IV describes
the approaches states are currently taking to e-commerce taxation and
considers whether those approaches may continue to be valid under the new
rule. Finally, noting still-unresolved issues in e-commerce taxation, Section
V offers a model provision for imposing sales and use tax on internet retail
that would respect continuing constitutional protections while still allowing
states to take full advantage of a rapidly-growing revenue source.
I.

THE RISE OF INTERNET RETAIL AND THE CURRENT SALES AND
USE TAXATION SYSTEM

Nearly 80% of adults in the United States are online shoppers as of
2016, which marks a considerable jump from the roughly 22% of American
adults who reported making online purchases in 2000.7 Additionally, over
half of those who reported making online purchases make at least several
purchases per month, and a majority of Americans will not buy from stores
without checking prices online first.8 There are many theories that purport
to explain this growth: the convenience of online retail,9 for example, or
consumers’ desire to compare and review products before purchasing.10
Whatever the cause, the fact remains that internet retail sales are on
the rise. To illustrate this point, e-commerce sales in the first quarter of 2007
accounted for only 3.2% of total retail sales in the United States, or $31.5
billion.11 By contrast, in the first quarter of 2017, e-commerce sales were
$105.7 billion, or 8.5% of total retail sales.12 That ten-year period saw a
significant leap in the productivity of online retail; the percentage of ecommerce sales in the market more than doubled, and the total value of e6. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
7. Smith & Anderson, supra note 3.
8. “Roughly one-in-five (21%) [adults in the U.S.] say they would buy from stores
without checking prices online[.]” Id.
9. Seventy-two percent of weekly online shoppers value the ability to buy online
without making a trip to the store. Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, Online shopping and
purchasing preferences, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2
016/12/19/online-shopping-and-purchasing-preferences/.
10. “Americans take a number of factors into consideration when shopping for
something that they haven’t purchased in the past – especially the ability to compare prices
from multiple sellers and to ask questions about what they are buying.” Id. “Better selection”
has also been identified as a leading reason that shoppers choose online retail. Barbara Thau,
New Study Reveals Why Consumers Really Shop Online (Surprise: It Isn’t Low Prices),
FORBES (Oct. 8, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/barbarathau/2013/10/08/whyconsumers-really-shop-online/#34b702b3c17a.
11. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, QUARTERLY RETAIL E-COMMERCE SALES 1ST QUARTER
2007 (2007), https://www.census.gov/mrts/www/data/pdf/07Q1.pdf.
12. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, QUARTERLY RETAIL E-COMMERCE SALES 1ST QUARTER
2017 (2017), https://www2.census.gov/retail/releases/historical/ecomm/17q1.pdf.
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commerce sales more than tripled.13 These macro-scale trends can be seen
at a micro level as well. For example, North American sales for the wellknown online retailer Amazon saw a 400% increase between 2010 and 2016,
rocketing from $16 billion to $80 billion.14 This growth has culminated in
an estimated $123.7 billion spent on e-commerce in the first quarter of
2018.15
While this trend is good news for the e-commerce market, its impact
on traditional retail may not be so positive. Brick-and-mortar stores have
seen continuing declines in traffic “[a]cross just about every sector and
virtually every time period.”16 Despite numerous positive markers for the
retail economy—wage growth is on a post-recession high even in America’s
lower- and middle-class families,17 GDP is on the rise, and overall retail
spending is up18—many brick-and-mortar stores are struggling to stay
afloat.19 Nine physical-store retailers filed for bankruptcy within the first
three months of 2017, placing 2017 on track to have the highest rate of
Chapter 11 filings for physical-store retailers since the Great Recession of
2008.20 Large retail chains like J.C. Penney and Macy’s have announced
hundreds of store closures, and mall visits dropped 50% from 2010 to 2013
and have continued to fall each year thereafter.21 As online retailers expand,

13. For a more in-depth look at the progression of e-commerce sales, the United States
Census Bureau provides a “Time Series” of e-commerce reports that charts the total and ecommerce sales (adjusted quarterly for seasonal variations, but not for price changes) of each
fiscal quarter, issuing from the fourth quarter of 1999 onward. See Monthly & Annual Retail
Trade, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 29, 2017), https://www.census.gov/retail/index.html#eco
mmerce (follow the “Adjusted Sales” hyperlink by the Time Series).
14. Derek Thompson, What in the World is Causing the Retail Meltdown of 2017?, THE
ATLANTIC (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/04/retail-me
ltdown-of-2017/522384/.
15. In all, e-commerce accounted for nearly one-tenth of total sales in the United States
during the first quarter of 2018. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, QUARTERLY RETAIL E-COMMERCE
SALES 1ST QUARTER 2018 (2018), https://www2.census.gov/retail/releases/historical/ecomm/
18q1.pdf.
16. Steve Dennis, What if Retail Traffic Declines Last Forever?, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2017,
10:47 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevendennis/2017/02/16/what-if-retail-trafficdeclines-last-forever/#667101d962c0.
17. Derek Thompson, The Most Underrated Story about the U.S. Economy, THE
ATLANTIC (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/03/wagesrising/519114/.
18. Thompson, supra note 14.
19. See Krystina Gustafson, Retail Bankruptcies March Toward Post-Recession High,
CNBC (Mar. 31, 2017, 6:54 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/31/retail-bankruptcies-ma
rch-toward-post-recession-high.html.
20. Id.
21. Thompson, supra note 14.
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shopping in brick-and-mortar stores declines.22 While it would be an
oversimplification of a complex issue to say that e-commerce is wholly
responsible for the downfall of the brick-and-mortar, the former certainly
appears to have stolen some of the latter’s financial thunder.23
Some companies, however, are adapting to the change. After
integrating its physical storefronts with new online platforms, the home
improvement retail chain Home Depot saw a 6% increase in sales for its U.S.
stores and generated $90 billion in annual revenue in 2016, all without
opening any new storefronts in the last three years.24 Its online sales revenues
rose from 1% in 2011 to 5.6% in 2016.25 Walmart is another example,
announcing a whopping 63% growth in its e-commerce sales in the second
fiscal quarter of 2017, as well as an overall rise in sales.26 Its announcement
came in the year following Walmart’s overhaul of its e-commerce strategy,
which included the $3.3 billion purchase of Jet, a successful online bulk
retailer.27 Both companies have developed ways to expand their internet
retail presence to take advantage of the online marketplace, and both
companies have experienced concurrent increases in overall sales.
The lesson to be learned from these examples is among the most
fundamental of business principles: adapt to survive. And this principle
extends not only to companies, but to state governments as well. Because
state governments derive a large amount of their tax revenue from sales and
use taxes, they are in many ways dependent upon the retail market for
income.28 In the first fiscal quarter of 2017, sales and gross receipts taxes
accounted for $72.4 billion, or 31.4% of total tax revenue.29 This marked an
increase of 2.3% from the same quarter in 2016,30 indicating an increased
reliance on sales tax for state tax revenue. That reliance is even higher in
some regions of the United States. In the South, for instance, sales and gross
22. Id. (identifying the “rise in e-commerce” as a contributor to the decline of brick and
mortar shopping).
23. Id.
24. Here’s How Home Depot’s E-Commerce Strategy is Driving Growth, FORBES (Feb.
15, 2017, 1:41 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2017/02/15/heres-howhome-depots-e-commerce-strategy-is-driving-growth/#41a5650e9b62.
25. Id.
26. Rachel Abrams, Walmart, With Amazon in Its Cross Hairs, Posts E-Commerce
Gains, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/18/business/walmartonline-sales-jump-63-percent.html?mcubz=3.
27. Id.
28. See Semuels, supra note 4.
29. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, QUARTERLY SUMMARY OF STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT TAX REVENUE FOR 2017: Q1 2017), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Cen
sus/library/publications/2017/econ/g17-qtax1.pdf [hereinafter TAX REVENUE SUMMARY 2017:
Q1].
30. Id.
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receipts make up 40.4% of state tax revenue,31 and some local governments
receive half of their budgets from sales taxes levied on top of the state rates.32
As a result, there is a positive correlation between taxable retail sales
and state tax revenue: where taxable sales have begun to stagnate, so too have
tax revenues. From 2013 to 2014, sales tax revenue rose 5.6%.33 By contrast,
sales tax revenue rose only 2% between the first quarters of 2016 and 2017.34
The term “rose” may be misleading in this context. While the first quarter of
2017 still reported a growth, the rate of the growth was significantly lower
than that of the 2013–2014 year, which is troubling when one considers that
state spending is also increasing each year.35
To repurpose a popular analogy,36 state budgets are leaky buckets
from which an ever-increasing flow of water escapes in the form of public
expenditures. The leak is immaterial as long as the output is as great or
greater than the input. But where, as here, a source of income is petering out
while expenditures continue to grow, it poses a significant problem for state
economies. If trends continue as is, sales tax growth will continue to decrease
while government expenditures continue to increase. Prospectively, this
threatens the tax-dependent economies of states and local governments,
particularly those who derive so much of their revenue from retail sales tax.37
When the amount of water entering a leaky bucket fails to match or exceed
the amount leaving it, the bucket will eventually run dry.
To limit their dependency on a declining revenue source and keep up
with growing expenditures, states have begun to look to other markets to
supplement their income. E-commerce is a rapidly expanding arena in retail
that would help bolster sales tax revenue, thus restoring a more comfortable
balance between output and input in state economies. If state governments
31. Id.
32. Semuels, supra note 4.
33. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, QUARTERLY SUMMARY OF STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT TAX REVENUE FOR 2014: Q1 (2014), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Ce
nsus/library/publications/2014/econ/g14-qtax1.pdf.
34. TAX REVENUE SUMMARY 2017: Q1, supra note 29.
35. “Direct state and local spending on general government increased from
approximately $1.1 billion in 1977 (in inflation-adjusted 2015 dollars) to $2.8 billion in
2015—a 170 percent increase over 38 years.” State and Local Expenditures, THE URBAN INST.,
http://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/state-local-financeinitiative/projects/state-and-local-backgrounders/state-and-local-expenditures (last visited
Aug. 25, 2017).
36. The leaky bucket analogy derives from Arthur Okun’s theory on public economics
and the redistribution of wealth. See Bill Conerly, Economic Impacts of Inequality, FORBES
(Aug. 18, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/billconerly/2014/08/18/economic-impacts-ofinequality/#1a01e4f2530c.
37. Consider again those Southern states and local governments who derive as much as
half of their income from sales and use taxes. See TAX REVENUE SUMMARY 2017: Q1, supra
note 29; Semuels, supra note 4.
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can develop a way to effectively access that revenue source—as some of the
forward-thinking companies described above have done, to their notable
benefit—then they may secure a flourishing resource that will help sustain
their economies in the fast-approaching future.
II.

INTERNET RETAIL JURISPRUDENCE AND THE PHYSICAL
PRESENCE REQUIREMENT

Having established that states would likely benefit from imposing
sales and use taxes on internet retail, two inquiries naturally arise. First, do
states have the authority to impose such a tax? And second, if they do have
the authority, how should states go about incorporating an e-commerce sales
and use tax into their state taxation schemes? These questions form the basis
of discussion for Parts II through V.
With regard to the first question—whether or not states have the
authority to systemically tax e-commerce—the short answer was, until
recently, a qualified “no.” No, because there have historically been
significant obstacles to imposing sales and use tax on large portions of ecommerce revenue. Qualified, because as in many other areas of the law, the
answer here is vastly more complex than a simple “yes” or “no.”
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that not all forms of
e-commerce are created equally, at least, not for purposes of sales and use
taxation. The term “e-commerce” casts a very broad net. It has been defined
as “[t]he practice of buying and selling goods and services through online
consumer services and of conducting other business activities using an
electronic device and the Internet.”38 This definition includes both (1)
internet retailers that are located within the territorial boundaries of the state,
be it through their headquarters, storefronts, distribution centers, etc.; and (2)
internet retailers located out-of-state, with no physical presence within the
territorial bounds of the state. The second category may be interchangeably
referred to as “remote retailers” or “out-of-state sellers.”39
In the past, these two categories of e-commerce have not always
received the same treatment for tax purposes.40 Taxes imposed on out-ofstate sellers who nonetheless maintained a physical location within the taxing
38. E-commerce, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
39. “Out-of-state seller[s]” refers to those retailers whose place of incorporation or
principal place of business is not the state imposing the tax. See Quill Corp. v. Heitkamp ex
rel. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 302 (1992), overruled by South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138
S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (using the term to refer to a business incorporated in Delaware with offices
in Illinois, California, and Georgia, that was operating in North Dakota); Nat’l Bellas Hess,
Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 753-54 (1967) (referring to a business incorporated
in Delaware with its principal place of business in North Kansas, doing business in Illinois).
40. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. 753.
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state have been upheld,41 while taxes imposed on out-of-state sellers with no
physical locations in the taxing state have been invalidated.42 These
disparities may seem arbitrary at first glance, but in reality, they reflect the
changing approaches to taxing out-of-state retailers.
Judicial approaches to taxing out-of-state retailers revolve primarily
around two constitutional limits on a state’s power to tax: the Due Process
Clause and the Commerce Clause.43 Within the last fifty years, the
interpretations and applications of these constitutional limitations have
changed significantly with regard to taxation by implementing different
presence requirements for out-of-state retailers in the taxing states. This, in
turn, has placed and removed obstacles for states hoping to impose taxes on
e-commerce retailers, including those with and without physical presences in
the taxing state.
To understand how these obstacles have arisen and changed over the
course of the last half-century, case law in the area is highly instructive. In
particular, three cases out of the United States Supreme Court highlight the
changing treatment of out-of-state retail sales tax. The first, National Bellas
Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of State of Illinois (“Bellas Hess”),
established a bright-line rule for analyzing state taxes under the constitutional
requirement of Due Process.44 The second, Quill Corp. v. Heitkamp ex rel.
North Dakota (“Quill”), replaced the Bellas Hess rule for Due Process
analyses and, in the same decision, preserved it for analyses under the
Commerce Clause.45 Finally, the third case, Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl
(“Direct Marketing”), signaled the Court’s changing attitude toward the
physical presence requirement and paved the way for the latest shift in ecommerce taxation jurisprudence.46
A.

Due Process and the Bellas Hess Bright-Line

In 1967, the mail order company National Bellas Hess (“National”)
appeared before the U.S. Supreme Court in an action to recover assessed use
taxes.47 These taxes were paid to the Department of Revenue of the State of
Illinois, the defendant in the case, in accordance with section 439.3 of the
41. Id. at 757 (noting that a state’s taxing power has been upheld where a mail order
seller maintained local retail stores).
42. Id. at 758 (“But the Court has never held that a State may impose the duty of use tax
collection and payment upon a seller whose only connection with customers in the State is by
common carrier or the United States mail.”).
43. Quill, 504 U.S. at 305.
44. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 753.
45. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 298.
46. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015).
47. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 753-54.
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Illinois Use Tax Act of 1965.48 The act provided, in relevant part, that any
retailer “[e]ngaging in soliciting orders within [Illinois] from users by means
of catalogues or other advertising” could be classified as retailers doing
business in the state.49 As one such retailer, National was required to collect
use taxes on any sales it made to customers within the State of Illinois.50 The
Illinois Supreme Court noted the following in its opinion:
(National) does not maintain in Illinois any office,
distribution house, sales house, warehouse or any other place
of business; it does not have in Illinois any agent, salesman,
canvasser, solicitor or other type of representative to sell or
take orders, to deliver merchandise, to accept payments, or
to service merchandise it sells; it does not own any tangible
property, real or personal, in Illinois; it has no telephone
listing in Illinois and it has not advertised its merchandise
for sale in newspapers, on billboards, or by radio or
television in Illinois.51
The U.S. Supreme Court adopted this factual finding.52
National filed suit, arguing that Illinois’s tax code violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and unconstitutionally
burdened interstate commerce.53 The Court in Bellas Hess agreed.54 In its
decision, the Court recognized that the Due Process Clause permits states to
levy taxes on out-of-state businesses only when the state “has given
[something] for which it can ask return.”55 This can be measured in terms of
opportunities, benefits, or protection that the state has afforded the business.56
The Bellas Hess Court therefore required “‘some definite link, some
minimum connection’” between the state and the retailer it sought to tax.57
With respect to out-of-state sellers, the Court was willing to grant the
existence of minimum contacts where the retailer “maintained local retail
stores” or had agents operating locally in the state.58 However, where a
seller’s “only connection with customers in the State [was] by common
48. Id. at 754.
49. Id. at 755.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 754.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 756.
54. Id. at 760.
55. Id. at 765 (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940)).
56. J.C. Penney, 311 U.S. at 444.
57. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756 (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340,
344–45 (1954)).
58. Id. at 757.
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carrier or the United States mail,” the Court found that imposing taxes
violated Due Process.59 Such sellers did not receive sufficient benefits from
the state for the state to exact taxes.60 In making this distinction, the Court
in Bellas Hess essentially created a bright-line rule for taxation and Due
Process: retailers must have some form of physical presence in a state—i.e.,
a storefront, local sales force, or office—in order to be subject to the state’s
use tax laws.61 Under the Bellas Hess holding, states imposing taxes on
retailers without a physical presence would have “no legitimate claim to
impose ‘a fair share of the cost of the local government’” and would
unjustifiably impose significant burdens on out-of-state retailers.62 In this
way, according to the Court, legislation like the Illinois Use Tax Act would
undermine the very purpose of the Commerce Clause, which is to protect the
national economy from such unjustifiable burdens.63
While e-commerce was almost certainly not contemplated in the
1967 Bellas Hess decision, some of the principles set forth by the Court are
still applicable. Chiefly, although physical presence is no longer a brightline requirement for taxing out-of-state retailers, it will generally be
sufficient to establish a taxable nexus with the state.64 Relating this premise
back to the earlier discussion of the categories of e-commerce, internet
retailers that do have a physical presence within the taxing state will likely
be subject to the sales and use tax schemes of that state. The more difficult
inquiry, and the one more germane to the goals of this discussion, is whether
retailers that do not have a physical presence within the taxing state—remote
internet retailers—may be required to collect sales and use tax. For this
inquiry, it is instructive to look to subsequent changes in the law, beginning
with the rule set forth in Quill.

59. Id. at 758.
60. Id.
61. This bright-line rule was later expressly expanded to include sales tax, in addition
to the original use tax. Quill Corp. v. Heitkamp ex rel. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992),
overruled by South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (“Whether or not a State
may compel a vendor to collect a sales or use tax may turn on the presence in the taxing State
of a small sales force, plant, or office.”).
62. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 760. If other states imposed upon out-of-state retailers their
own varied tax rates, allowable exemptions, and record-keeping requirements, it would
“entangle [retailers’] interstate business in a virtual welter of complicated obligations to local
jurisdictions[.]” Id. at 759–60.
63. Id. at 760.
64. As will be discussed in the next subsection, the modern inquiry for Due Process is
“whether a defendant’s contacts with the forum made it reasonable, in the context of our
federal system of Government, to require it to defend the suit in that State.” Quill, 504 U.S. at
307. Purposeful availment via physical presence in the state likely satisfies this requirement.
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Quill and the Commerce Clause

Approximately twenty-five years after its decision in Bellas Hess,
the U.S. Supreme Court was again called upon to address the issue of
imposing sales and use taxes on remote retailers.65 The Supreme Court ruled
on Quill in 1992, which provided, until recently, the controlling
jurisprudence on e-commerce taxation.66
The case began when the State of North Dakota filed an action
seeking declaratory judgment against Quill Corporation (“Quill Corp.”) that
would require Quill Corp. to collect and pay a use tax on goods purchased
for use within the state.67 Quill Corp. was a mail-order office supply
company with no offices, warehouses, employees, or significant personal
property in North Dakota.68 All sales to North Dakota customers, which
amounted to approximately $1 million annually, were fulfilled via mail or
common carrier.69
Similarly to Illinois in Bellas Hess, North Dakota’s use tax statute
required every “retailer maintaining a place of business” in the state to collect
a use tax.70 Included in this classification was “every person who engages in
regular or systematic solicitation of a consumer market in th[e] state.”71
Therefore, North Dakota claimed that Quill Corp. should have been required
to collect and pay a use tax on any items sold for use in the state, irrespective
of its lack of physical presence in North Dakota.72
In addressing the claim, the Court considered whether the tax
conformed with requirements under both the Due Process Clause and the
Commerce Clause.73 If the Court had chosen to apply the bright-line physical
presence requirement laid out in Bellas Hess, the tax almost certainly would
have failed Due Process muster. However, as the Court noted, its Due
Process jurisprudence had “evolved substantially in the [twenty-five] years
since Bellas Hess,” largely precipitated by changes in personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence.74 Historically, courts relied on physical presence within a
65. Id. at 298.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 302.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 302–03.
72. Id. at 301.
73. Id. at 305.
74. Id. at 307. The interrelatedness of these two concepts—personal jurisdiction and
taxation power—derives from their shared origin. Both arise from the Due Process
requirement of the Federal Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment, which limits a state’s
power to affect the rights and obligations of persons not within that state’s sovereign authority.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878). Both require “minimum contacts” to be established
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state’s territorial jurisdiction to satisfy Due Process.75 As forms of notice—
that is, service of summons—began to change, the Supreme Court shifted the
cornerstone of Due Process from the rigid physical presence requirement to
something less mechanical.76
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the Court articulated the
test for Due Process as it pertained to in personam jurisdiction: whether
maintaining a state’s jurisdiction would offend “traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.”77 This standard extended to corporations as
well as individuals,78 and in 1977, the standard was further extended by
Shaffer v. Heitner, to cover “all assertions of state-court jurisdiction[.]”79
Under the interpretation set out in International Shoe and extended by
Shaffer, the Due Process Clause was satisfied when a corporation had “such
contacts . . . with the state of the forum as to make it reasonable.”80 Under
this test, even if a corporation had no physical presence in the taxing state, it
could be subject to a state’s jurisdiction if it had “purposefully avail[ed] itself
of the benefits of an economic market in the forum State.”81 Stated another
way, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected the notion that a lack of
physical contact in a state can defeat personal jurisdiction there.82
This test reflected the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “minimum
contacts” at the time of Quill.83 Accordingly, rather than relying on Bellas
Hess’s outmoded physical presence requirement, the Court in Quill looked
to the Due Process test prescribed in International Shoe.84 Under this test,
the Court found that the Due Process Clause did not bar enforcement of North
Dakota’s use tax statute because Quill Corp. had purposefully directed
between the state and the party sought to be brought within the state’s authority, be that
authority commercial or judicial. See also, Quill, 504 U.S. at 298 (requiring “minimum
contacts” for imposing sales and use taxes); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash. Office of Unemployment
Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (requiring “minimum contacts” for the
maintenance of a suit by a state court). Accordingly, as the Court’s interpretation of “minimum
contacts” changes with personal jurisdiction case law, so too does it change with respect to
tax law.
75. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (citing Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 316–17.
79. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
80. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
81. Quill Corp. v. Heitkamp ex rel. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307 (1992), overruled
by South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
82. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985).
83. Although Bellas Hess was decided in 1967, a full twenty-two years after
International Shoe, the Court’s subsequent applications of the International Shoe standard
placed it closer in time to the Quill decision of 1992. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 307 (referencing
Shaffer and Burger King).
84. Id. at 308.
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business activities at North Dakota residents with sufficient magnitude, such
that imposing the tax would not offend “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.”85 This marked a significant shift from the mechanical
physical presence test of Bellas Hess. Under the new rule, it was possible for
a company like Quill Corp., whose only contacts with a state were through
mail and common carrier, to be subject to that state’s use tax laws—at least
as far as Due Process restrictions were concerned. Applying that same
principle to remote internet retailers, a state could theoretically impose sales
and use tax on sales made within the state without violating the Due Process
Clause.86
If the analysis had ended there, states would have at least had a
chance of enforcing sales and use taxes against individual retailers, assuming
they could prove minimum contacts. However, the constitutionality analysis
for properly imposing a tax is two-fold. And, as the Court in Quill pointed
out, “while a state may, consistent with the Due Process Clause, have the
authority to tax a particular taxpayer, imposition of the tax may nonetheless
violate the Commerce Clause.”87 It is the latter wherein lay a persisting
obstacle to taxing remote internet retailers: the Commerce Clause and its
penumbra, the Dormant Commerce Clause.
By its express language, the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution provides Congress the power “to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several states[.]”88 However, the Commerce
Clause has been read by the Supreme Court to include a sort of “negative” or
“dormant” aspect in addition to its affirmative grant of power to Congress.89
The Dormant Commerce Clause acts through the courts even “in the absence
of any action by Congress,” with the purpose of preventing economic
isolationism.90 In other words, the courts use the Dormant Commerce Clause
to strike down state laws that unduly burden the flow of commerce across
state borders, including by taxing interstate commerce.91

85. Id.
86. This assumes, for argument’s sake, that the magnitude of the retailer’s contacts with
the state would be sufficient. The Court in Quill does not discuss at any length how to
determine magnitude of contacts, but given that Quill Corp. sold approximately $1 million in
North Dakota, it is likely fair to say that sales over $1 million in the taxing state would be
sufficient to satisfy Due Process requirements.
87. Id. at 305.
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
89. E.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 192 (1994) (recognizing a
“negative” aspect of the Commerce Clause that prohibits economic protectionism and undue
burdens on interstate commerce).
90. Quill, 504 U.S. at 309.
91. See, e.g., id. at 309–10.
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It is within this authority that the Quill Court undertook its
Commerce Clause analysis of the North Dakota tax.92 To be sustained
against a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge, a tax must (1) be applied to
an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, (2) be fairly
apportioned, (3) not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) be
fairly related to the services provided by the state.93 Both Bellas Hess and
Quill draw specific attention to the first requirement, the “substantial nexus”
requirement.94 The question then becomes whether contact solely through
mail or common carrier, as is the case with remote retailers, is sufficient to
establish a substantial nexus with the taxing state. North Dakota argued that
it must be sufficient if that same conduct was sufficient to satisfy the Due
Process Clause.95
The Supreme Court disagreed.96 In defense of this position, it
explained the fundamental differences between the Due Process Clause and
the Commerce Clause: the former is intended to ensure fairness, while the
latter is designed to protect the structure of the nation’s economy.97 Included
among these structural concerns is that of interstate commerce,98 which
Bellas Hess found to be unduly burdened by the taxation of remote retailers.99
The Court in Quill seemed to agree with that assessment, finding that “the
bright-line rule of Bellas Hess furthers the ends of the Dormant Commerce
Clause” by ensuring retailers receive some benefit from the states before
being subjected to taxes by those states.100 Accordingly, the Court preserved
the physical presence requirement of Bellas Hess for purposes of the
Commerce Clause—but not for the Due Process Clause—and ultimately
determined that North Dakota could not require Quill Corp. to collect use
taxes for sales in the state.101

92. Id. at 311.
93. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
94. Quill, 504 U.S. at 311.
95. “The State contends that the nexus requirements imposed by the Due Process and
Commerce Clauses are equivalent and that if, as we concluded above, a mail-order house that
lacks a physical presence in the taxing State nonetheless satisfies the due process ‘minimum
contacts’ test, then that corporation also meets the Commerce Clause ‘substantial nexus’ test.”
Id. at 312.
96. Id; see also the discussion supra note 62 (relating to the unjustifiable burdens of
allowing states to impose varied tax requirements on out-of-state sellers, which in turn receive
little to no benefit from the states).
97. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.
98. Id. (“Accordingly, we have ruled that [the Commerce Clause] prohibits
discrimination against interstate commerce . . . and bars state regulations that unduly burden
interstate commerce[.]”) (citations omitted).
99. Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 759–60 (1967).
100. Quill, 504 U.S. at 314–15.
101. Id. at 318–19.
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This holding severely limited states’ authority to tax certain types of
e-commerce revenue. Under Quill, states were generally able to reach the
sales of local internet retailers and even out-of-state retailers with a physical
presence in the state.102 However, Quill effectively blocked states from
taxing an entire category of internet retailers—the remote retailers. The
physical presence requirement barred the imposition of taxes on these
retailers, irrespective of the amount of otherwise taxable sales done in the
state. As a result, even though states could access some internet retailers for
sales and use tax purposes, Quill remained a significant obstacle to states’
ability to fully capitalize on the e-commerce marketplace. However, Quill
was not without opposition, and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in the Direct
Marketing decision in 2015, as well as Justice White’s separate opinion in
Quill itself, may well have laid the foundation for Quill’s ultimate demise.
C.

Judicial Criticism of the Quill Decision

In 2015, Kennedy called upon the Court to strongly reconsider its
holding in Quill—and to do it quickly.103 “Given [the] changes in technology
and consumer sophistication,” he wrote in his concurring opinion to Direct
Marketing, “it is unwise to delay any longer a reconsideration of the Court’s
holding in Quill.”104 He cited a nearly $3 billion increase in e-commerce
sales per year between the Court’s decision in Quill and 2008, illustrating
how “urgent” the cause for reconsideration has become.105 Quill’s
incompatibility with the changing times “inflict[s] extreme harm and
unfairness on the [s]tates.”106 This call to action signaled an awareness in the
Supreme Court that Quill no longer suited the nation’s economy or, indeed,

102. Some states have also found that the physical presence requirement for substantial
nexus may be satisfied “by others’ in-state activities taken on behalf of an out-of-state
retailer.” This form of satisfaction has been referred to as “attributional nexus.” Here, for
example, an independent contractor—rather than an out-and-out employee—acting on a
retailer’s behalf could be sufficient to establish a nexus with the state seeking to impose sales
and use tax on the retailer’s sales in the state. Andrew J. Haile, Affiliate Nexus in E-Commerce,
33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1803, 1811–12 (2012).
103. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
104. Id.
105. Kennedy writes, “When the Court decided Quill, mail-order sales in the United
States totaled $180 billion. But in 1992, the Internet was in its infancy. By 2008, e-commerce
sales alone totaled $3.16 trillion per year in the United States.” Id. (citations omitted).
Additionally, Kennedy points to “shortfall[s]” in state revenues, “unfairness to local retailers
and their customers who do pay taxes at the register,” and losses arising from an inability to
tax sales from out-of-state vendors. Id. For example, “Colorado’s losses in 2012 [were]
estimated to be around $170 million.” Id.
106. Id. at 1134.
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even its jurisprudence.107 It also showed a willingness—and, arguably, a
demand—to change it.
Furthermore, Kennedy’s call to reconsider was not the first decrial
of the majority opinion in Quill. Three of the justices who concurred in the
holding, including Kennedy, did so “based on stare decisis alone,” creating
a “tenuous” foundation upon which the ruling rests.108 It is also worth noting
that the Quill Court’s partial upholding of Bellas Hess did not reflect the will
of the entire Court of its time.109 Through his partial dissent, White offered
some constructive insight into why the Court’s holding was perhaps in error,
and why the Court might consider “giving Bellas Hess the complete burial it
justly deserves” thereafter.110
As a starting point, White rejected the distinctions that the majority
drew between the “substantial nexus” requirements under Due Process,
which the majority described as a fairness inquiry, and those under the
Commerce Clause, which the majority found to be largely structural.111
Citing precedent, White asserted that the substantial nexus requirement was
“grounded in the Due Process Clause, and not the Commerce Clause,” and
that there was no independent substantial nexus requirement under the
Commerce Clause.112 Consequently, in his view, there was no precedent nor
justification for finding a nexus sufficient under one and insufficient under
the other.113
Without recognizing an independent nexus requirement for the
Commerce Clause, the holding in Quill would have likely been very
different: the contacts would have either failed under both clauses or
succeeded under both clauses. Given the Court’s more flexible inquiry for
Due Process considerations under International Shoe,114 the argument could

107. Kennedy notes that, “In Quill, the Court should have taken the opportunity to
reevaluate Bellas Hess not only in light of Complete Auto but also in view of the dramatic
technological and social changes that had taken place in our increasingly interconnected
economy.” Id. at 1134–35.
108. Id. at 1134. Kennedy calls Quill “[a] case questionable even when decided.” Id. at
1135.
109. White wrote a partial dissent to the majority’s opinion, while Justice Scalia (with
Kennedy and Justice Thomas joining) set out to qualify their concurrence with upholding the
Commerce Clause portion of the Bellas Hess decision. See Quill Corp. v. Heitkamp ex rel.
North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), overruled by South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct.
2080 (2018).
110. Id. at 322 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part).
111. Id. at 325.
112. Id. at 327.
113. Id.
114. See Part II-b for a discussion on the adoption and application of the International
Shoe standard.
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be made that the Court would have done away with the physical presence
requirement entirely.
However, even if this distinction remained good law, White posited
that the physical presence requirement had still outlived its usefulness.115 In
his opinion, “physical presence frequently [had] very little to do with a
transaction a State might seek to tax,”116 and out-of-state sellers still benefited
from the infrastructures of the states in which they did business.117 He
explained:
Nevertheless, an out-of-state direct marketer derives
numerous commercial benefits from the State in which it
does business. These advantages include laws establishing
sound local banking institutions to support credit
transactions; courts to ensure collection of the purchase price
from the seller’s customers; means of waste disposal from
garbage generated by mail-order solicitations; and creation
and enforcement of consumer protection laws, which protect
buyers and sellers alike, the former by ensuring that they will
have a ready means of protecting against fraud, and the latter
by creating a climate of consumer confidence that inures to
the benefit of reputable dealers in mail-order transactions.118
In so recognizing, White established a cognizable argument against
the physical presence requirement, even through the structural lens of the
Commerce Clause. By accessing a state’s financial institutions, its courts,
and its public services—even without a physical presence in the taxing
state—remote retailers would seem to obligate themselves to contribute their
just share of the state tax burden. Otherwise, the Quill Court risked
“perpetuating a rule that create[d] an interstate tax shelter for one form of
business”119—in this case, internet retailers—without offering a comparable
advantage for its competitors. Kennedy echoed this point in his Direct
Marketing concurrence, discussing the “concomitant unfairness to local
retailers and their customers” of, effectively, shielding remote retailers from
sales tax obligations.120

115. Quill, 504 U.S. at 327–28.
116. Id. at 328.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 329 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part).
120. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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Additionally, while the physical presence requirement was heralded
by the Court to establish clear-cut boundaries for states’ tax authority,121 as
well as encourage “settled expectations” for businesses and investors,122
subsequent caselaw showed that the physical presence requirement was
perhaps not as clear-cut as the Quill majority suggested. White’s dissent
provided some guidance in that regard, as well.123 While the bright-line test
is more concrete than, say, a balancing inquiry, it still raised a vital question:
what constitutes “physical presence”? As White pointed out, “[r]easonable
minds surely can, and will, differ over what showing is required to make out
a ‘physical presence’ adequate to justify imposing responsibilities for use tax
collection.”124
This proverbial gray area invited what might be construed as veiled
judicial resistance by lower courts to the full sweep of Quill. For example,
in National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization
(“National Geographic”), the Court found that a company with two offices
in the State still had a sufficient nexus with the State to be subject to use
tax.125 On its face, this holding seems unproblematic. However, when one
considers that each office housed only one salesperson and one secretary,126
and that both offices together made only $1 million annually in sales,127 the
case begins to raise concerns: namely, how much physical presence is
required to justify imposing sales tax liability?
In National Geographic, the Court expressly rejected a “slightest
presence” standard for satisfying physical presence.128 However, that
qualification in and of itself, as White pointed out in Quill, would seem to
shift the test away from a true bright-line rule.129 If too little physical
presence will not satisfy the test, then where and how should that line be
drawn? To determine physical presence, should courts look at the number of
employees in the taxing state? The number of offices? The amount of
property owned in the taxing state? With shoppers’ favorite stores just “a
click away—regardless of how close or far the nearest storefront[,]” Kennedy
121. Thus, reducing litigation concerning those taxes. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315–16.
122. Id. at 316.
123. See id. at 330 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part).
124. Id. at 330–31.
125. See Nat’l Geographic Soc’y. v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
126. Id. at 554 n.2.
127. Id. at 556. Compare this to Quill Corp., which also made almost $1 million sales to
about 3,000 customers in North Dakota and was the sixth largest vendor of office supplies in
the state, but who under the Quill decision, was not liable for North Dakota sales tax. Quill,
504 U.S. at 302.
128. Nat’l Geographic, 430 U.S. at 556.
129. Quill, 504 U.S. at 330 (“In my view, the question of Quill’s actual physical presence
is sufficiently close to cast doubt on the majority’s confidence that it is propounding a truly
‘bright-line’ rule.”).
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questioned whether physical presence was even an appropriate metric at
all.130
Ultimately, between the lingering uncertainty of the metes and
bounds of physical presence, the purported unfairness of its protection to
remote retailers, and the need to respond to the ever-changing reality of ecommerce, it was perhaps only a matter of time before the Court reconsidered
the place of physical presence in e-commerce taxation.131
III.

THE WAYFAIR DECISION

Nearly twenty-five years after its decision in Quill, the Supreme
Court was presented with the opportunity to revisit its position on the
physical presence requirement for internet retail taxation. That opportunity
came when South Dakota enacted Senate Bill 106 (“S. 106”) in 2016.132 S.
106 was enacted “to provide for the collection of sales taxes from certain
remote sellers, to establish certain Legislative findings, and to declare an
emergency.”133 In effect, S. 106 “requires out-of-state sellers to collect and
remit sales tax ‘as if the seller had a physical presence in the state.’”134 South
Dakota limited the reach of S. 106, however, by (1) restricting its application
to remote retailers that, “on an annual basis, deliver more than $100,000 of
goods or services into the State or engage in 200 or more separate
transactions for the delivery of goods or services into the State”; (2)
foreclosing any retroactive application of the Act’s sales tax collection and
remission requirements; and (3) staying the Act’s effective date until the
constitutionality of the law could be established.135
To satisfy the third limitation and to conform to provisions of S. 106
requiring “expeditious judicial review,” South Dakota filed a declaratory
judgment action in state court against a number of merchants making sales
in South Dakota, including Wayfair, Inc., which each had no employees or
real estate in the state and collected no South Dakota sales tax on its
transactions.136 The action sought “a declaration that the requirements of the
Act [were] valid and applicable to respondents and an injunction requiring
130. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
131. See id. (“The legal system should find an appropriate case for this Court to
reexamine Quill and Bellas Hess.”).
132. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (“In 2016, South Dakota
confronted the serious inequity Quill imposes by enacting . . . S. 106, 2016 Legis. Assemb.,
91st Sess. (S.D. 2016)[.]”).
133. Id. at 2088.
134. Id. at 2089.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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respondents to register for licenses to collect and remit sales tax,” despite the
Bellas Hess and Quill precedent clearly requiring physical presence for the
imposition of sales tax requirements.137
Indeed, South Dakota plainly recognized the conflicting precedent.
In response to the merchants’ motion for summary judgment at the trial court
level, South Dakota “conceded that [S. 106 could not] survive under Bellas
Hess and Quill”; however, it asked the judiciary to reconsider those decisions
“in light of current economic realities.”138 The trial court granted the
merchants’ motion for summary judgment, and the South Dakota Supreme
Court affirmed based upon existing U.S. Supreme Court precedent.139 In
January 2018, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider, once again,
whether physical presence should remain the standard for e-commerce and
remote retail taxation.140
A.

The Wayfair Decision

Arguments for South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. (“Wayfair”) were heard
in April 2018, and on June 21, 2018, the Wayfair Court issued the opinion
that would be the death knell for the physical presence requirement in ecommerce taxation.141 A closely-divided Supreme Court elected to uphold
the South Dakota tax scheme, and in doing so, overruled the Quill decision
and the common law it had created.142 It did so on the belief that “Quill was
flawed on its own terms.”143 Specifically, the Court highlighted three
weaknesses of Quill that, in its view, established the need to change
directions: (1) Quill’s flawed interpretation of the nexus requirement; (2) the
generation, rather than resolution, of “market distortions” by the physical
presence requirement; and (3) the “arbitrary, formalistic distinction[s]”
imposed by Quill, which “modern Commerce Clause precedents
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. In its opinion, the South Dakota Supreme Court stated, “However persuasive the
State’s arguments on the merits of revisiting the issue, Quill has not been overruled. Quill
remains the controlling precedent on the issue of Commerce Clause limitations on interstate
collection of sales and use taxes” and elected to “leave to that Court ‘the prerogative of
overruling its own decisions.’” State v. Wayfair Inc., 901 N.W.2d 754, 761 (S.D. 2017), cert.
granted South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 735 (2018), and vacated and remanded
South Dakota v. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
140. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 735.
141. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080.
142. The decision was 5–4, with Kennedy delivering the opinion of the Court, in which
Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito, and Gorsuch joined; Justices Thomas and Gorsuch filing
concurring opinions; and Chief Justice Roberts filing a dissenting opinion, in which Justices
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Id. at 2087.
143. Id. at 2092.
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disavow.”144 As discussed in greater detail below, many of these criticisms
track with previous concerns raised about the Quill decision.
First, the Court stated that physical presence is not necessary to
create a substantial nexus with a state for purposes of imposing a sales tax.145
As discussed above, the Supreme Court has consistently taken the position
that “a business need not have a physical presence in a State to satisfy the
demands of due process.”146 In that regard, the Quill Court was in harmony
with its successors in Wayfair; it held that, for purposes of Due Process,
physical presence was unnecessary.147 Where the Quill Court erred,
according to Wayfair, was in applying a different rule to substantial nexus
determinations under the Commerce Clause.148 Rather, neither Due Process
nor the Commerce Clause requires physical contact with the taxing state;
instead, “[t]here just must be ‘a substantial nexus with the taxing State.’”149
Further, the Wayfair Court stated that the sale of goods or services into a
taxing state “has a sufficient nexus to the State in which the sale is
consummated to be treated as a local transaction taxable by that State.”150
Accordingly, because S. 106 applies only to sales of “tangible personal
property, products transferred electronically, or services for delivery into
South Dakota[,]”151 and further, only to retailers that do either $100,000
worth in sales or 200 separate transactions into the state, the Wayfair Court
found that there was a substantial nexus, regardless of the merchants’ lack of
physical presence in South Dakota.152
Second, the Court raised concerns about market interference created
by the physical presence requirement of Quill.153 By prohibiting states from
taxing remote retailers, Quill effectively established a sort of judiciallycreated tax shelter for those retailers, while shifting the tax burden to local
retailers and their customers.154 Remote retailers had a competitive
advantage because they could avoid the “regulatory burdens of tax
144. Id. at 2085.
145. Id. at 2093.
146. Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)).
147. Quill Corp. v. Heitkamp ex rel. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308 (1992), overruled
by South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
148. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2093 (“When considering whether a State may levy a tax,
Due Process and Commerce Clause standards may not be identical or coterminous, but there
are significant parallels. The reasons given in Quill for rejecting the physical presence rule for
due process purposes apply as well to the question whether physical presence is a requisite for
an out-of-state seller’s liability to remit sales taxes.”).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2092.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2099.
153. Id. at 2092.
154. Id. at 2094.
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collection” and offer lower prices to consumers than their local counterparts
could, solely because they had no real estate or employees in the taxing
state.155 This criticism echoes Kennedy’s Direct Marketing concurrence,
where he also expressed concerns about the “unfairness” of excusing remote
retailers from paying their “fair share” of state taxes.156 Furthermore, Quill
actually incentivized retailers to avoid establishing physical contacts with a
state, thus discouraging the creation of “storefronts, distribution points, and
employment centers that otherwise would be efficient or desirable.”157 In
short, the Wayfair Court found that it is “not the purpose of the [C]ommerce
[C]lause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share
of state tax burden,” nor is it the purpose of the Commerce Clause to
empower the judiciary to distort the marketplace.158 According to the Court,
The Commerce Clause must not prefer interstate commerce
only to the point where a merchant physically crosses state
borders. Rejecting the physical presence rule is necessary to
ensure that artificial competitive advantages are not created
by this Court’s precedents. This Court should not prevent
States from collecting lawful taxes through a physical
presence rule that can be satisfied only if there is an
employee or a building in the State.159
Consequently, in order to abolish any artificial competitive
advantages created by the Court through its precedent, the Court rejected the
physical presence requirement and allowed an economic nexus to satisfy the
Commerce Clause.160
Third, echoing the criticism of White in his partial dissent of Quill,
the Wayfair Court decried the physical presence requirement as an
“anachronistic”161 distinction that “simply makes no sense.”162 The Court
155. Id. The Court also discusses the economic realities supporting the taxation of remote
retailers, including estimates that Bellas Hess and Quill cause states to lose between $8 and
$33 billion every year and low consumer compliance rates with use tax collection. Id. at 2088.
156. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
157. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2094.
161. Recall in his partial dissent, White called the physical presence requirement an
“anachronistic notion” and discussed the illogic of retaining such a requirement for the
taxation of remote retailers. Quill Corp. v. Heitkamp ex rel. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 328
(2018) (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part), overruled by South
Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
162. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094–95.
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used the illustration of two online furniture retailers, one with a warehouse
in the South Dakota, and one with a warehouse just outside South Dakota
and a virtual showroom available to consumers to view the selection.163 In
this thought experiment, which is a reality for online retailers like Wayfair,
Inc.,164 the first retailer would be subject to South Dakota’s sales tax
requirements, even for those sales that had nothing to do with the warehouse,
while the second retailer could not be subjected to the state’s sales tax
requirements, even if it made the same or greater quantity of sales to South
Dakota consumers.165 It is, as the Court pointed out, difficult to understand
why one may be burdened with collecting and remitting sales tax, while the
other may not, on an “arbitrary” ground such as physical presence.166
For that reason, and for those discussed before it, the Wayfair Court
overruled Quill and finally put to rest the physical presence requirement in
its entirety.167 Without physical presence, the analysis now aligns with the
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady test, which is simply “whether the tax
applies to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State.”168 The
Court applied this new standard to South Dakota’s S. 106, which allows the
state to impose its sales tax on remote retailers that exceed the de minimis
threshold of $100,000 or 200 transactions of goods and services delivered
into the state, and ultimately held that the legislation passed constitutional
muster.169 The Court reasoned that retailers that exceed the de minimis
threshold of business into South Dakota and maintain an “extensive” virtual
presence in the state have “availed [themselves] of the substantial privilege
of carrying on business in South Dakota.”170 Thus, the substantial nexus
requirement is satisfied. This holding marks a new age in remote retail tax
liability, the effects of which are numerous, varied, and discussed in greater
detail below.

163. Id. at 2094.
164. For example, in 2016, Wayfair, Inc. launched an augmented reality mobile
application that would allow shoppers to “explore, rearrange, and discover furniture and décor
from Wayfair’s catalog” against the backdrop of their own outdoor space. Wayfair Launches
Virtual Reality App to Customize Outdoor Spaces with Furnishings and Décor, WAYFAIR.COM
(Aug. 23, 2016), https://investor.wayfair.com/investor-relations/press-releases/press-releasesdetails/2016/Wayfair-Launches-Virtual-Reality-App-to-Customize-Outdoor-Spaces-withFurnishings-and-Dcor/default.aspx.
165. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094.
166. Id. 2096.
167. Id. at 2099.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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Effects and Implications of the Wayfair Decision

As a starting point, the most obvious effect of the Wayfair decision
is that physical presence is no longer a necessary element of substantial nexus
for taxing remote retailers.171 That is not to say physical presence is no longer
considered as part of the substantial nexus analysis; however, it is now
possible to have the latter without the former.172 From this primary effect,
however, flow numerous secondary ramifications that will further shape the
future of e-commerce taxation—some for better, and some, perhaps, for
worse.
Under the Wayfair rule, states may now impose taxes on the sales of
certain retailers with no physical presence within the state.173 This opens the
field for states to collect what the Government Accountability Office
(“GAO”) estimates to be billions of dollars annually in previously untapped
revenues.174 In turn, this bolsters states’ sales tax bases, which for some
states comprise a majority of their general funds.175 And, at least at first
glance, it also levels the proverbial playing field between local retailers and
remote retailers with respect to sales tax collection.176
However, as the dissent in Wayfair indicates, the reality may be more
complicated than a simple balancing of the scale, and the purported benefits
of removing the physical presence requirement may also come with notable
costs.177 Bellas Hess, which first established the physical presence
requirement and its protection of remote retailers from state sales tax liability,
was decided in 1967.178 Accordingly, retailers operated under some
configuration of the physical presence requirement for over fifty years before
the Wayfair case was decided. Under that rule, e-commerce grew into a
thriving, prosperous market,179 and the alteration of that rule should not be
171. Id. at 2097.
172. Id. at 2093 (“Although physical presence ‘frequently will enhance’ a business’
connection with a State, ‘it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial
amount of business is transacted . . . [with no] need for physical presence within a state in
which business is conducted.’”).
173. This is not a blanket rule, as discussed later in the section, but the removal of the
physical presence requirement certainly gives states greater access to a broader range of
retailers than they preciously had. See id.
174. Id. at 2088, 2103 (majority opinion and Roberts, C. J., dissenting, respectively)
(citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-114, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTERS: SALES TAXES, STATES COULD GAIN REVENUE FROM EXPANDED AUTHORITY, BUT
BUSINESSES ARE LIKELY TO EXPERIENCE COMPLIANCE COSTS 5 (2017)).
175. Id. at 2088 (majority opinion).
176. Id. at 2094.
177. See id. at 2101 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting).
178. Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
179. See supra Section I.

308

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:2: 284

undertaken lightly.180 A convincing argument could be made, after all, that
it is not mere coincidence that e-commerce has prospered so greatly under
the physical presence rule; rather, it could be said that the rule is a cause of,
rather than a mere correlation to, the strength of the e-commerce market
today.181
With such a critical market hinging on the Court’s decision, one can
understand the dissent’s unease with a decision that leaves e-commerce tax
liability on unsteady ground. Indeed, in the wake of Wayfair, remote retailers
know that their lack of physical presence alone will not shield them from
state sales tax liability. However, while the physical presence “bright-line”
was by no means clear-cut,182 it still offered more guidance than the
substantial nexus analysis as it now stands. By answering the question before
it—whether physical presence should be required to establish substantial
nexus for purposes of imposing sales tax on remote retailers—the Court in
Wayfair raised so many more. What, if not physical presence, are the metes
and bounds of substantial nexus? May states set a lower threshold than
$100,000 in sales or 200 separate transactions into the state and still satisfy
the requirement? In fact, must states set a de minimis threshold in their sales
tax legislation at all? Further, to take a broader view of the issue, is it even
necessary that states base their sales tax schemes on the economic
involvement of retailers with the state, or is there some other metric by which
substantial nexus may be established?
Arguably, states looking to take a more well-settled path could
simply copy South Dakota’s approach with S. 106 and would thereby also
survive constitutional challenge. However, even that route could not
guaranty the validity of a state’s tax scheme, given the other potentially
invalidating Commerce Clause principles that the Court did not discuss or
resolve.183 Specifically, the Court identified the risk of discrimination against

180. In his dissent in Wayfair, Roberts avers that Congress, rather than the judiciary,
should spearhead any changes to e-commerce taxation. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2101 (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting) (“E-commerce has grown into a significant and vibrant part of our national
economy against the backdrop of established rules, including the physical-presence rule. Any
alteration to those rules with the potential to disrupt the development of such a critical segment
of the economy should be undertaken by Congress. The Court should not act on this important
question of current economic policy, solely to expiate a mistake it made over 50 years ago.”).
181. Id. at 2104 (“An erroneous decision from this Court may well have been an
unintended factor contributing to the growth of e-commerce.”).
182. See Quill Corp. v. Heitkamp ex rel. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 330–31 (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part), overruled by South Dakota v. Wayfair,
Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
183. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099.
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interstate commerce, the potential for retroactive application, and unduly
burdensome tax requirements as areas for concern moving forward.184
As to the first, the risk of discrimination against interstate commerce,
states must consider that South Dakota’s economic approach to substantial
nexus is inherently more suited to a state with a destination-based tax
system.185 In the destination-based system, taxes on goods that cross state
lines are imposed at their ultimate destination—usually the purchaser, but not
always, as is the case of import-for-export or sale-for-resale—because that is
typically where the goods are consumed.186 This is generally thought to
promote neutrality between intrastate and interstate commerce because it
treats “all goods consumed in the state in the same way, regardless of the
location from which they were shipped.”187 Accordingly, for states such as
South Dakota that use a destination-based tax system,188 there is little cause
for concern.
However, to understand why the economic nexus approach needs a
destination-based system, it helps to consider an example of a state with a
different system. In Tennessee, a taxable sale occurs upon “any transfer of
title or possession, or both” for consideration.189 This is fine when the title
and possession are transferred simultaneously. On the other hand, imagine a
scenario where an internet retailer in Tennessee makes a sale to a customer
in a destination-tax state; imagine further that title transfers, as it often does,
the moment the retailer places the good into transport with a common carrier.
In this scenario, the retailer could theoretically be liable for Tennessee sales
tax for the transfer of title and for the destination state’s sales tax for the
transfer of possession.
This risk of double-taxation obviously raises very serious Dormant
Commerce Clause concerns, and under South Dakota’s approach in Wayfair,
184. These issues, the Court found, were not sufficient to “justify retaining [an] artificial,
anachronistic rule” such as physical presence “that deprives States of vast revenues from major
businesses.” Id. at 2099–100.
185. Charles E. McClure, Jr., Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Economic Objectives,
Technological Constraints, and Tax Laws, 52 TAX L. REV. 269, 318 (1997) (“Tax policy
considerations suggest that sales taxes should be imposed on a destination basis—that tax
should be collected by the jurisdiction where consumption occurs, not where production
occurs.”).
186. 2 JEROME HELLERSTEIN, WALTER HELLERSTEIN & JOHN A. SWAIN, STATE TAXATION
¶ 18.02[1] (3d ed. 2012).
187. Id.
188. South Dakota considers the location a sale occurs to be the location where the
ultimate consumer receives the product. SOUTH DAKOTA DEP’T OF REVENUE, SALES AND USE
TAX GUIDE 3 (2018).
189. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-6-102(80)(A) (West 2018). Many other states share this
definition of a taxable sale. However, differing interpretations of export and resale exemptions
in those states keep the emphasis on the ultimate consumption of the good at its destination,
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 186, at ¶18.02[2](a), which is less germane to this illustration.

310

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:2: 284

both “taxable sales” could count toward a retailer’s nexus with each state.
Accordingly, even if a state such as Tennessee mirrored South Dakota’s
legislation, the nature of the rest of its tax structure could ultimately render
its e-commerce taxation legislation invalid under the Commerce Clause.
Next, the Court recognized retroactivity as a potential area of
complication.190 In South Dakota’s case, S. 106 expressly prohibits
retroactive application of its sales tax obligations.191 Accordingly, the issue
of retroactivity was not before the Wayfair Court, and it was not definitively
ruled upon.192 This leaves something of an open door for states following
South Dakota’s lead; they may either create prospective legislation, as did
South Dakota, or they may attempt to retroactively require remote retailers
to collect and remit sales tax on items already sold. Such a retroactive
application could constitute double tax burden, where states have imposed
use taxes upon the consumer of the good before Wayfair and may later seek
to impose sales tax liability on the retailer for the same transaction.193 This
could render invalid a state’s e-commerce taxation legislation, even if the
state followed South Dakota’s rule and the Wayfair opinion in all other
respects.194
Finally, there is the risk of unduly burdening interstate commerce
with the imposition of sales tax on remote retailers.195 The most notable
burden, as it pertains to sales tax liabilities of remote retailers, is the
administrative cost of compliance with differing tax schemes across
multitudinous jurisdictions.196 Specifically, as the Quill Court noted, “a state
tax might unduly burden interstate commerce” by subjecting retailers to the
various and often dissimilar tax-collection obligations in thousands of
different taxing jurisdictions.197 For example, the dissent in Wayfair
discusses how “New Jersey knitters pay sales tax on yarn purchased for art
projects, but not on yarn earmarked for sweaters,” and “Texas taxes sales of
plain deodorant at 6.25 percent but imposes no tax on deodorant with
antiperspirant.”198
To further compound this complication, there were an estimated
10,814 different tax jurisdictions across the United States in October 2017,
190. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099.
191. Id. at 2089; see also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-64-6 (2018) (“No obligation to remit
the sales tax required by this chapter may be applied retroactively.”).
192. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099.
193. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors and Economists in Support of Petitioner at 7
n.5, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 17-494), 2018 WL 1203458.
194. Id.
195. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2098.
196. Id. at 2104 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 2093 (majority opinion) (quoting Quill Corp. v. Heitkamp ex rel. North Dakota
, 504 U.S. 298, 313 n.6 (1992)).
198. Id. at 2103-04 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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and as many as 1,594 taxing jurisdictions in a single state.199 Remote retailers
doing business in multiple states must contend not only with the different tax
schemes of the different states, but also the different tax schemes across
individual taxing jurisdictions within those states. In his dissent, Chief
Justice Roberts voiced concerns that this burden will not only negatively
impact interstate commerce, but will fall disproportionately on small
businesses, particularly those “that do not have established legal teams,
software systems, or outside counsel to assist with compliance related
questions.”200 Additionally, software that might help businesses comply with
such diverse tax requirements across numerous jurisdictions is “still in its
infancy” and thus may not mitigate the immense burdens of regulatory
compliance for remote retailers.201
The Court did not address these burdens in any great detail on
account of South Dakota’s membership in the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax
Agreement (“SSUTA”), which “affords small merchants a reasonable degree
of protection.”202 As the Court recognized, the more than twenty states that
are party to the SSUTA present fewer compliance challenges to remote
retailers.203 The SSUTA requires a single, state-level tax administration,
uniform definitions of products and services, simplified tax rate structures,
and uniform destination-based sourcing for sales into a state from a remote
retailer.204 This minimizes compliance costs within a particular state, which
reduces the burden on retailers doing business with that state.
However, as of the date of publication of this Article, only twentythree states are fully parties to the SSUTA.205 This means that the majority
of states do not offer the same protection to remote retailers as does South
Dakota, and the SSUTA does not act to alleviate compliance burdens for
those states. Consequently, even if a state that is not party to the SSUTA

199. April Loughead, Growing Number of State Sales Tax Jurisdictions Makes South
Dakota v. Wayfair That Much More Imperative, TAX FOUND. (Apr. 17, 2018),
https://taxfoundation.org/growing-number-state-sales-tax-jurisdictions-makes-south-dakotav-wayfair-much-imperative/.
200. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2104 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
201. Id.
202. See id. at 2098–99 (majority opinion).
203. Id. at 2099–100.
204. Id.
205. The full member states are Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Streamlined Sales Tax Governing Board, State Info,
https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/index.php?page=state-info (last visited Aug. 10, 2018).
Tennessee is an “associate” member, which means it has substantially, but not entirely,
complied with the SSUTA requirements. Id.

312

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:2: 284

replicates South Dakota’s e-commerce tax schemes, it may still run afoul of
the Commerce Clause as unduly burdensome to interstate commerce.
Owing to that area of uncertainty, as well as the others discussed
above, Wayfair cannot be said to be the ultimate solution to the e-commerce
taxation conundrum. Perhaps, rather, it is only a single judicial step in what
may be a multi-branch effort to both capitalize on the massive e-commerce
revenue source and foster its continued growth in the years to come. As both
the majority and the dissent in Wayfair point out, Congress may legislate to
address the many problems still facing e-commerce taxation.206 It may, in
fact, be better suited to the task than the Court, given the capacity of Congress
to “investigate and analyze facts beyond anything the Judiciary could match”
and to “focus directly on current policy concerns rather than past legal
mistakes.”207 However, until Congress takes the stage, if in fact it ever does,
states must look to Wayfair to guide their sales and use tax schemes for
remote retailers. Accordingly, the next section analyzes states’ current
approaches to taxing remote retailers through the lens of Wayfair to
determine what works, what doesn’t, and what remains to be seen.

IV.

STATE APPROACHES TO TAXING E-COMMERCE REVENUE

Even before Quill had taken its final bow on the remote retail
taxation stage, many states took steps to prepare for—and even help bring
about—its metaphorical curtain call. In an effort to capitalize on e-commerce
revenue, many states have been requiring remote internet retailers to collect
and remit sales and use tax “they feel e-retailers owe to [them],” irrespective
of the Quill impediments.208 States have employed a variety of methods to
accomplish this aim, but three methods have emerged in recent years as the
most prominent among the fifty states: economic nexus, affiliate (and clickthrough) nexus, and reporting requirements.209 Each looks to a different
206. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2098, 2101. However, Roberts has expressed concerns that
the Wayfair decision may, in fact, impede Congress’ attempts to regulate in this area. Id. at
2102–03 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Nothing in today’s decision precludes Congress from
continuing to seek a legislative solution. But by suddenly changing the ground rules, the Court
may have waylaid Congress’s consideration of the issue. Armed with today’s decision, state
officials can be expected to redirect their attention from working with Congress on a national
solution, to securing new tax revenue from remote retailers.”).
207. Id. at 2104.
208. Geoffrey E. Weyl, Quibbling with Quill: Are States Powerless in Enforcing Sales
and Use Tax-Related Obligations on Out-of-State Retailers?, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 253, 264
(2012) (“[D]ue to declining revenue during the current economic recession, many states have
sought to enact legislation that forces e-retailers to collect sales taxes. The states argue that
they are being unreasonably deprived of revenue they are entitled to receive.”).
209. Remote Seller Nexus Chart, SALES TAX INST. (Oct. 5, 2018), http://www.salestaxin
stitute.com/resources/remote-seller-nexus-chart.
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retail component to establish the state’s authority to tax a remote retailer, and
each has its unique benefits and disadvantages with respect to e-commerce
taxation, as well as unique implications under the new Wayfair precedent.
A.

Economic Nexus

In a survey of all fifty states, economic nexus emerged as the modern
trend in taxing remote internet retailers even before Wayfair approved South
Dakota’s economic nexus-based tax scheme.210 Rather than placing the
emphasis on a retailer’s physical presence within the state, the economic
nexus approach looks to whether a taxable sale occurs within the state.211
Stated another way, even if a retailer has no physical presence within the
taxing state, if it makes taxable sales into the state, then that state may
theoretically impose sales and use taxes on those sales. The approach is
predicated on the idea that “[t]axable activity should imply nexus.”212 It also
conforms with International Shoe’s Due Process Principles, which provide
that if an out-of-state seller “purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an
economic market in the forum State,” Due Process is satisfied.213 Now that
Wayfair has effectively made Due Process and the Commerce Clause
analyses coterminous, the Commerce Clause is, by extension, also satisfied
by such availment. Essentially, by directing its economic activities into a
state, a retailer makes reasonable the exercise of state authority.
There are limits to the application of the economic nexus approach,
however. Conventional wisdom on economic nexus taxation is that it should
only be applied to retailers who surpass a certain de minimis “threshold” of
sales in the state to avoid overburdening small businesses and businesses
doing only negligible business in the taxing state.214 It also helps states avoid
Due Process and Commerce Clause concerns by preventing them from taxing
retailers who receive relatively little benefit from—and, therefore, have
relatively little connection to—the taxing state, or overburdening smaller
retailers with the regulatory costs of compliance. This approach would seem

210. Other forms were more popular in earlier years. However, of the twenty-one states
who have attempted to implement new e-commerce taxation schemes since 2015, over half
have gone the way of economic nexus. Id.
211. Brian S. Masterson, Collecting Sales and Use Tax on Electronic Commerce: EConfusion or E-Collection, 79 N.C. L. REV. 203, 214–15 (2000).
212. Id. at 214 (quoting Charles E. McLure, Jr., Taxation of Electronic Commerce:
Economic Objectives, Technological Constraints, and Tax Laws, 52 TAX L. REV. 269, 395
(1997)).
213. Quill Corp. v. Heitkamp ex rel. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307 (1992) (citing
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985)), overruled by South Dakota v.
Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
214. Masterson, supra note 211, at 214.
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to reflect a similar methodology to e-commerce taxation as the Marketplace
Fairness Act of 2017.215
States implementing the economic nexus system, such as South
Dakota, follow a basic model: they seek to impose sales and use taxes on
remote retailers whose in-state sales exceed the de minimis threshold in a
calendar year. States, however, have differed in their individual de minimis
thresholds for imposing those taxes. Of the dozen or so states implementing
the economic nexus system, most can be categorized as having one of two
threshold requirements: (1) the lesser of $100,000 total in-state sales or 200
separate transactions or (2) $500,000 total in-state sales.216 South Dakota’s
tax scheme provides a prime example of the former, while Tennessee models
the latter.217
As discussed above, South Dakota’s S. 106 requires that remote
retailers collect and remit sales tax on “tangible personal property, products
transferred electronically, or services for delivery into South Dakota” if they
satisfy one of two requirements in the previous or current calendar year:
(1) The seller’s gross revenue from the sale of tangible
personal property, any product transferred electronically, or
services delivered into South Dakota exceeds one hundred
thousand dollars; or
(2) The seller sold tangible personal property, any product
transferred electronically, or services for delivery into South
Dakota in two hundred or more separate transactions.218
This de minimis threshold also reflects the approach of a significant
number of economic nexus states.219 For example, in late June of 2017,
Maine passed an act requiring remote sellers to collect and remit sales and

215. The Marketplace Fairness Act of 2017 would allow states to collect sales and use
taxes on sales done by non-small-seller remote retailers. The most notable distinction is that,
where many economic nexus states base their de minimis threshold on the amount of sales
done in that state, the Marketplace Fairness Act of 2017 would base its small-seller exception
to taxability on annual gross receipts in total U.S. remote sales. See Marketplace Fairness Act
of 2017, S. 976, 115th Cong. (2017).
216. See Remote Seller Nexus Chart, supra note 209 (information may be accessed by
clicking through each state’s link under the ‘economic nexus’ column of the chart).
217. S.B. 106, 2016 Leg. Assemb., 91st Sess. (S.D. 2016); Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs.
1320-05-01-.129(2) (2017) [hereinafter “Rule 129”].
218. S.B. 106, 2016 Leg. Assemb., 91st Sess. (S.D. 2016).
219. Other states that have attempted to use this structure include Indiana, Maine, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, and Vermont. See Remote Seller Nexus Chart, supra note 209.
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use taxes on sales made into the state by retailers exceeding the $100,000
sales or 200 transactions de minimis threshold.220
Prior to Wayfair, a second category of economic nexus threshold was
also making its way through the judicial system. In January 2017,
Tennessee’s Department of Revenue issued notice concerning its Rule 132005-01-.129(2) (“Rule 129”), which provides that remote retailers whose total
sales to Tennessee customers in a 12-month period exceed $500,000 must
collect sales tax for sales made in Tennessee.221 Tennessee is one of several
states utilizing the $500,000 threshold for imposing sales and use tax on
internet retailers.222 This regulation has also been challenged, not unlike the
South Dakota regulation, though it did not make it to the Supreme Court. In
March 2017, a lawsuit was filed in the Chancery Court of Davidson County,
Tennessee, challenging the constitutionality of Rule 129.223 An agreed order
was subsequently entered on April 10, 2017, preventing the enforcement of
Rule 129 until a final judgment could be made on the case.224 The Tennessee
General Assembly also passed legislation prohibiting the collection of any
internet sales or use taxes authorized under 129 until the court’s ruling had
been reviewed and approved by the General Assembly.225
In light of Wayfair, it would seem that Rule 129 is likely to pass
constitutional muster. It tracks closely with South Dakota’s S. 106 in that it
sets a sales threshold, but it is more generous with that threshold and does
not offer the alternative of a number-of-transactions test.226 However, it is
unclear whether the Tennessee General Assembly, upon review of Rule 129,
will choose to reinstate the rule or explore alternative options. The foregoing
illustrates an interesting question for economic nexus states left open in the
wake of Wayfair: how low can they go? States like Tennessee, with a higher
economic de minimis than South Dakota’s, might choose to lower their
thresholds into line with South Dakota to capture more tax revenue. They
220. An Act To Require Remote Sellers To Collect and Remit Sales and Use Tax on Sales
into Maine, MAINE STATE LEGISLATURE, https://legislature.maine.gov/bills/displayps.asp?pa
per=SP0483&snum=128&PID=1456 (last viewed Sept. 15, 2017).
221. Rule 129, supra note 217.
222. Massachusetts has also proposed to use the $500,000 threshold. 830 ME. CODE R.
§ 64H.1.7. Ohio has also set a $500,000 threshold on taxing remote retailers, but it does so
through a business-privilege tax. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5751.01(I)(3) (West 2018).
Interestingly, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the physical presence requirement outlined in
Quill is restricted to sales and use taxes; it does not extend to a business-privilege tax like
Ohio’s, and accordingly, the tax was upheld as constitutionally sound. See Crutchfield Corp.
v. Testa, No. 2015-0386, 2016 WL 6775765 (Ohio Nov. 17, 2016).
223. TENN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, NOTICE #17-12, OUT-OF-STATE DEALER REGISTRATION
ENFORCEMENT DELAYED (May 2017).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Rule 129, supra note 217.
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might also attempt to go lower. As discussed above, states using the
economic nexus may even choose to forego a de minimis threshold
altogether. While it is true that the threshold limits potential constitutional
challenges for unduly burdensome tax schemes, nothing in the Wayfair
decision expressly requires states to set one.227 After Wayfair, states know
that $100,000 in sales or 200 transactions is sufficient for nexus, but they
cannot yet know if that threshold is required for nexus.
Regardless, however, of the many unanswered questions still circling
economic nexus tax schemes in light of Wayfair, it is clear from the foregoing
analysis that many states believe the economic nexus approach is the most
promising way to accomplish their e-commerce taxation goals. The Wayfair
decision only serves to bolster that conclusion. In its wake, states will likely
begin, those that have not already, implementing their own economic nexusbased tax schemes to tap into the internet retail market.
B.

Affiliate and Click-Through Nexus

Although not as contemporarily popular as its economic counterpart,
the affiliate nexus approach gained significant traction in the late 2000s and
early 2010s.228 To establish nexus, states using the affiliate nexus approach
look to whether (1) an out-of-state retailer shares common ownership with
an in-state retailer; and (2) the two entities operate a unitary business
enterprise, generally for tax purposes.229 Stated another way, if an affiliate
of a remote retailer can be subjected to sales and use tax in a state, then the
remote retailer may also be subject to sales and use tax in that state.
California’s Assembly Bill 155 (“A.B. 155”), passed on September
9, 2011, is a prime example of how the system was implemented.230 Under
A.B. 155, an out-of-state retailer is considered to have substantial nexus for
sales and use tax purposes if it “is a member of a commonly controlled
group . . . and is a member of a combined reporting group . . . that includes
another member of the retailer’s commonly controlled group that” that
performs services in the state on behalf of the out-of-state retailer.231
Unfortunately, determining “affiliation” for purposes of nexus is an
incredibly complex, multi-step process involving dueling principles of
corporate formalities and economic realities,232 the full nature of which is

227. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
228. Remote Seller Nexus Chart, supra note 209.
229. Haile, supra note 102, at 1813.
230. Id. at 1814.
231. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6203 (West 2018).
232. For an in-depth analysis of affiliate nexus taxation, see John Swain, Cybertaxation
and the Commerce Clause: Entity Isolation or Affiliate Nexus, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 419 (2002).
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beyond the scope of this note. Lower courts across the board have also
tended to reject this approach to remote retail taxation.233
There is, however, an “offshoot” of affiliate nexus that avoids some
of its problematic complexities while maintaining many of its practical
effects: the click-through nexus approach. With click-through nexus laws,
also known as “referrer nexus,” a remote retailer can trigger sales and use tax
liability by establishing business arrangements with an in-state entity that,
for some sort of commission or consideration, refers potential customers to
the remote retailer, typically through links on internet webpages.234 This
nexus approach is often combined with some form of economic nexus de
minimis threshold, though the threshold is usually lower than the ones
discussed in the economic nexus analysis above.235 Again, after Wayfair, it
is uncertain if a de minimis threshold is actually required.
A number of states, including California,236 have explored this
approach as a basis for imposing sales and use taxes on remote retailers.237
Arguably, it requires fewer moving parts than its more Byzantine
counterpart, affiliate nexus. The analysis centers around a singular
contractual arrangement, as opposed to ongoing business relationships,
corporate structures, and even combined tax reporting eligibility. However,
as something of a trade-off for its more simplistic design, click-through
application is inherently limited to the online solicitation of potential
customers by in-state entities, while affiliate nexus could be more broadly
applied. It also has not escaped the mire of judicial disapproval.
For example, Illinois enacted a click-through nexus provision
through its House Bill 3659 in 2011. H.B. 3659 provided that a remote
retailer could trigger tax liability by “having a contract with a person located
in [Illinois] under which the person, for a commission or other
consideration . . . refer[red] potential customers to the retailer by a link on
the person’s Internet website.”238 The provision was subsequently
challenged, and in the 2013 case Performance Marketing Ass’n, Inc. v.
Hamer, the Illinois Supreme Court found the provision to be void and
unenforceable.239 Attempts to utilize both the affiliate and click-through
233. Haile, supra note 102, at 1821.
234. David Gamage & Devin Heckman, A Better Way Forward for State Taxation of ECommerce, 92 B.U. L. REV. 483, 518–19 (2012).
235. Id. at 519.
236. See generally Robert Ziegler, California Enacts “Click-Through” and Affiliate
Nexus Provisions Requiring Sales Tax Collection, 22 ST. & LOC. TAXES WEEKLY, July 5, 2011,
at 1, WESTLAW.
237. Remote Seller Nexus Chart, supra note 209.
238. H.B. 3659, 96th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2011).
239. The Illinois Supreme Court did not actually reach the issue of whether the clickthrough nexus provision was an unconstitutional abridgement of the Commerce Clause, nor
did it address any abrogation of Quill. Rather, the Court found that the provision imposed a
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nexus approaches to taxing remote retailers have dwindled in recent years.
However, following Wayfair’s abolition of the physical presence
requirement, such approaches could see a resurgence.
C.

Notice and Reporting Requirements

The preceding sections discussed states’ various attempts to
implement economic and affiliate nexus systems. Although there are
significant differences between the two methods, they share at least one
commonality: both are methods of directly imposing sales and use taxes on
the remote retailers. They seek to bring the retailer within the taxing
authority of the state and, accordingly, have come into conflict with
constitutional and statutory principles of what constitutes a taxable,
substantial nexus.
The notice and reporting requirements approach to collecting taxes
from remote retail sales represents a fundamentally different way of
accessing that revenue source. This approach focuses not on the imposition
of sales tax, but on the effective collection of use taxes. A use tax is a tax
imposed on the use of goods, rather than the purchase of goods, that are
bought outside the taxing state.240 Accordingly, rather than attempting to
directly tax sales by the remote retailer, notice and reporting requirement
laws seek to tax use of out-of-state goods and services by in-state
consumers.241 However, as the Court in Wayfair noted, “consumer
compliance rates are notoriously low[.]”242
To combat compliance issues, states using this approach often
require retailers to notify consumers about their use tax obligations on
purchases not subject to the states’ sales tax.243 Some states also require that
remote retailers provide reports of all sales made into that state for which
sales tax was not collected.244 Thus, “notice and reporting” requirements. In
discriminatory tax on electronic commerce, which violated an independent provision of the
federal Internet Tax Freedom Act. See Performance Mktg. Ass’n, Inc. v. Hamer, 998 N.E.2d
54, 59 (Ill. 2013). This could illustrate another potential complication for states seeking to
implement the click-through nexus system: while the physical presence requirement of Quill
is no longer an impediment to taxing remote retailers, other areas of federal law have been
found to preempt the application of click-through nexus. Such other laws could, as the Court
in Wayfair alluded to, be grounds to invalidate e-commerce taxation provisions. See South
Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018) (“The question remains whether some
other principle in the Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine might invalidate the Act.”).
240. Use Tax, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added).
241. Remote Seller Nexus Chart, supra note 209.
242. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2088.
243. Adam Ondo, A Solution to Use Tax Avoidance: Transaction Reporting
Requirements for Remote Sellers, 49 TEX. TECH L. REV. ONLINE ED. 77, 92 (2017).
244. Id.
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theory, this approach allows the states to access some of the revenue from
remote retail sales without attempting to directly impose tax on remote
retailers. In the past, doing so allowed them to avoid the physical presence
requirements set forth in Quill altogether.
In practice, the application is not so neat. Take, for example, the
notice and reporting requirements that Colorado effectuated in 2010.
Codified in Colorado Revised Statute Annotated § 39-21-112(3.5)(c)-(d), the
requirements provide the following for sales to Colorado purchasers on
which Colorado sales tax was not collected: (1) retailers must notify
Colorado purchasers “that sales or use tax is due on certain purchases made
from the retailer”; (2) retailers must notify Colorado purchasers “the total
amount paid by the purchaser for Colorado purchases made from the retailer
in the previous calendar year”; and (3) retailers must file annual statements
for each purchaser, reporting the total amount of sales to those purchasers in
the previous calendar year.245 Failure to provide the notice under (1) will
subject the retailer to a five dollar penalty per failure, while failure to provide
the report under (3) will subject the retailer to a ten dollar penalty per
failure.246
This provision of Colorado tax law was challenged in Direct
Marketing Association v. Huber (“Huber”) on the grounds that the notice and
reporting requirements discriminated against and imposed undue burdens on
interstate commerce.247 The United States District Court for the District of
Colorado agreed, citing Quill for the proposition that “a state law that
imposes a use tax collection burden on a retailer with no physical presence
in the state causes an undue burden on interstate commerce.”248 On appeal,
however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit thought
otherwise, even while Quill was still considered good law.249 In Direct
Marketing, the Tenth Circuit explained, “Quill applies narrowly to and has
not been extended beyond tax collection.”250 And because the Court found
the notice and report requirements to be separate from the collection and
remission of taxes, it held that the Colorado law did not violate the
Commerce Clause, nor did it conflict with the Supreme Court’s holding in
Quill.251
245. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-21-112(3.5)(c)–(d) (West 2017).
246. Id.
247. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Huber, No. 10-CV-01546-REB-CBS, 2012 WL 1079175, at
*3 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2012), rev’d sub nom. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129 (10th
Cir. 2016).
248. Id. at *9.
249. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1139 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S.
Ct. 591 (2016), and cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 593 (2016).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1144.
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The Direct Marketing line of cases draws attention to an issue of
central importance to notice and reporting requirements: discrimination
against interstate commerce. The issue is more pronounced with this
approach to taxation, as opposed to economic nexus and affiliate nexus,
where the state seeks simply to impose the same sales tax on both in-state
and out-of-state retailers. Here, because the notice-report requirements focus
primarily on use tax from retailers that do not collect sales tax—particularly
in states where local retailers are obligated to pay sales tax, and are thus not
subject to the requirements—the burdens would seem to fall more heavily on
remote retailers.252 This was the district court’s primary basis for
determining that the Colorado law violated the Dormant Commerce
Clause.253 But, as the Tenth Circuit pointed out in overruling the district
court’s decision, imposing the requirements served a more equifinal purpose:
they effectively sought to put all businesses, in-state and out-of-state, on
equal footing.254
In theory, so long as a state can maintain this balance, its noticereport requirements will not violate constitutional protections for interstate
commerce. States may endeavor to do so in a number of ways, such as
compensating retailers for the cost of complying with the notice-reporting
requirements,255 since many states already offer compensation for the cost of
complying with sales and use tax collection requirements.256 States should
also take steps to streamline the process for out-of-state retailers, and
methods for doing so may include some of the following: making “form”
notices readily available to out-of-state retailers, listing those purchases
eligible for use tax exemptions,257 and for those states that collect a resident
income tax, including a line on income tax returns on which residents report
use tax dues.258
252. Id. at 1140.
253. Id.
254. See generally id.; see also Ondo, supra note 243, at 98.
255. Ondo, supra note 243, at 101.
256. Ondo also recommends that states provide an exception for small-sellers, such as
those making less than $100,000 in sales to in-state purchasers. Id. This use of what is
effectively a de minimis threshold for tax liability further lessens the burdens of notice and
reporting requirements on out-of-state retailers.
257. Colorado’s provision includes language about including use tax exemptions on the
notice to consumers “if known by the retailer.” COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §39-21-112(3.5)(d)
(I)(A) (West 2017).
258. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado suggested this as an
alternative to notice-reporting requirements. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Huber, No. 10-CV-01546REB-CBS, 2012 WL 1079175, at *6 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2012, rev’d sub nom, Direct Mktg.
Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2016). However, it could also be used to supplement
the notice requirements imposed on retailers, thus shifting some of the burden from the
retailers to the state and consumers.
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Colorado represents the successful maintenance of this precarious
balance. Unfortunately, even the successful application of this approach may
be subject to criticism given the “impracticability” of the collection of use
taxes.259 States must rely on their residents to pay the use taxes owed on their
purchases from remote retailers,260 and “consumers regularly fail to comply
with lawful use taxes.”261 This shortfall may have contributed to the lost
revenue reported by states under Bellas Hess and Quill.262 Accordingly, with
the physical presence requirement laid to rest and greater options for sales
tax imposition available, it is questionable how many states would choose to
keep their sales and use tax income eggs squarely in the use tax basket.
Of course, it is also important to note that the three approaches
described above do not exist in a vacuum, and they are not mutually
exclusive. Although some states may choose to use purely economic nexus,
purely affiliate nexus, or purely notice-report requirements in their respective
taxation schemes for e-commerce sales, other states may choose to employ a
combination of the various methodologies.263 Rhode Island’s House Bill
5175, for example, utilizes all three approaches to collecting sales and use
taxes from remote retailers.264
Certainly, some approaches have been utilized more than have
others, and some have seen more success in their utilization. Additionally,
there are different ways of implementing each approach that may yield
different results. With that in mind, the next section will offer a model
provision, illustrating an approach that seeks to capture the most advantages
for states’ tax schemes, while including the fewest practical and legal deficits.
The benefits of each provision will be discussed as well.
V.

MODEL PROVISION FOR STATE E-COMMERCE TAXATION
SCHEMES

Between growing e-commerce sales, the modern decline of brickand-mortar retailers, and the overall importance of sales and use tax revenue
to state funding schemes, states are highly motivated to find innovative ways
to access the e-commerce market. And with the fall of the physical presence
requirement, new doors have opened for states’ sales and use tax schemes.
The question then becomes how states should go about taxing remote retailers
to both maximize benefits for all parties and avoid constitutional challenge.
259. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2088 (2018) (quoting Nat’l
Geographic Soc’y. v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 555 (1977)).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 2098.
262. Id. at 2088.
263. Remote Seller Nexus Chart, supra note 209.
264. H.B. 5175, Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. 2017, (R.I. 2017).
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As explained in earlier sections, the fall of Quill means the demise
of the bright-line physical presence requirement for establishing substantial
nexus. It also means the beginning of a new question: If not physical
presence in the taxing state, what does constitute a substantial nexus for sales
and use taxation purposes? In the wake of Wayfair, the Supreme Court
appears to have offered at least one potential answer to that question. Given
the Court’s approval of the economic nexus approach in South Dakota, as
well as the rapid expansion of the economic nexus across the states, a seller’s
economic contacts with the taxing state is likely the best approach to taxing
e-commerce.265 Accordingly, a retailer’s sales tax liability in a certain state
may be predicated on the amount of taxable sales it makes to consumers in
that state.
This approach also gained some strong footing in early academic
discussions of the topic, and—when coupled with a de minimis exemption
for small-sellers—is the approach that would seem to produce the most
consistent, neutral impact on interstate commerce.266 It bases tax liability not
on economically impractical measures like physical presence, or complex
determinations of agency; rather, it centers wholly around the simple premise
that taxable activity within a state—above a certain de minimis threshold—
creates tax liability in that state.267 In doing so, it calls for a fundamentally
equivalent treatment of in-state retailers and out-of-state retailers:
[A] person with physical presence in a state or that sells
goods, whether tangible or intangible, or services for
delivery in a state where they are subject to sales or use tax
should be under the sales/use tax jurisdiction of that state,
unless such sales to a particular state are de minimis.
Similarly, a person that has a physical presence in the state
or that conducts activities in a state that are factors in the
formula the state uses to apportion income among the states
(commonly payroll, property, and sales) should be subject to
the income tax jurisdiction of that state, unless such
activities in the state are de minimis.268
While the balance is ultimately complicated by outside factors, it
must be said that the economic nexus approach at least provides a strong
starting point for a new, consistent understanding of substantial nexus.
265. Remote Seller Nexus Chart, supra note 209.
266. “Nexus should be predicated on the presence of taxable activity in the taxing
jurisdiction[,]” and “[n]exus should not exist in jurisdictions where otherwise taxable
economic activity is de minimis.” McClure, supra note 185, at 392.
267. Masterson, supra note 211, at 214.
268. McClure, supra note 185, at 395–96.
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To avoid “tipping the scales” in favor of in-state commerce, thus
inviting constitutional challenges under the Dormant Commerce Clause,
states should consider a number of things. The first is that the economic
nexus approach is inherently more suited to a state with a destination-based
tax system, as discussed in greater detail above.269 Accordingly, states like
Tennessee whose sales tax is not necessarily determined by the destination
or ultimate consumption of a good should consider adopting a destinationbased system, at least for purposes of e-commerce taxation. Failure to do so
may result in challenges under the Commerce Clause, as well as an increased
burden for remote retailers.
The second recommendation pertains to the de minimis threshold for
imposing tax liability on remote retailers. As a preliminary matter, while the
Supreme Court has not expressly required a de minimis threshold, states
should strongly consider implementing one in their own tax schemes. This
would help minimize the burden on smaller retailers and would also ensure
that there are, in fact, substantial contacts with the state sufficient to create a
taxable nexus.
Once a state has decided to set a de minimis threshold, the question
then becomes how the threshold should be calibrated. States employing the
economic nexus system have tended to base their de minimis threshold on the
amount of sales into the state, rather than the retailer’s aggregate national
sales.270 The former is a better method than the latter, notably because it
prevents retailers from being subject to taxation in states where they do
relatively little business; the state-sales model more closely reflects the
actual, substantial nexus with the taxing state, which is now the standard
under Wayfair.271 Higher de minimis amounts are less likely to face
constitutional challenge on nexus grounds, but the Supreme Court has
accepted a $100,000 sales or 200 separate transactions threshold, so that
provides a strong starting point.272 Additionally, the Supreme Court did not
approve that threshold as a minimum for substantial nexus, so the de minimis
threshold could theoretically be lower. In sum, the second recommendation
for taxing remote retailers would be that the de minimis threshold be based
on sales into the state, and be set at $100,000 in sales or 200 separate

269. See supra Section III.b (defining “destination-based tax system” and explaining the
need for such a system under an economic nexus approach to e-commerce taxation).
270. The “amount” of sales can refer to either the number of separate transactions, or the
total value of sales into the states. For example, Maine’s regulation would set the de minimis
threshold at $100,000 total sales or 200 separate transactions. S.P. 483, 128th Leg., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Me. 2017). Tennessee, on the other hand, sets its de minimis threshold purely at
$500,000 total sales. Rule 129, supra note 217.
271. McClure, supra note 185, at 400.
272. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018).
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transactions,273 to avoid constitutional challenge and avoid unduly burdening
small retailers with the high costs of compliance.
Third, states should include language prohibiting the retroactive
application of any internet retail taxation schemes they enact. While it’s true
that Wayfair did not expressly preclude retroactivity in e-commerce sales and
use taxation, the Court recognized that the prospective nature of South
Dakota’s S. 106 was a form of protection from undue burdens of taxation,
particularly for small retailers.274 Furthermore, in addition to creating
“massive exposure for retailers that never collected sales or use tax,”
retroactive application would run afoul of significant reliance concerns.275
Retailers, acting in “reasonable reliance on Quill and its predecessor,
National Bellas Hess,” have not been collecting sales and use tax on sales
made into states where those retailers do not have a physical presence.276 To
retroactively make those retailers liable for sales and use tax on those sales
would impose upon them a significant, unpredicted cost, as well as
potentially impose double tax burdens for the same transaction.277
Fortunately, in Wayfair, forty-one states joined to file an amicus curiae brief
wherein they “provided assurances to the U.S. Supreme Court that retroactive
application of any new decision would be unlikely and limited.”278 Even
states that did not join should consider the relative merits of a prospectiveonly application.
Fourth and finally, a system of taxing remote retailers would benefit
from uniformity across the states.279 This is especially true of e-commerce
taxation because of the inherently borderless nature of the internet. Sellers
from Washington may be on the same webpage as sellers from Florida;
purchasers from Hawaii may browse the same online stores as purchasers
from New York. There would seem to be something innately nonsensical
about imposing different nexus requirements on such a ubiquitous form of
retail. That is not to say state tax rates would have to be similar280 or even
that their apportionment methods would have to be the same across state
lines. By simply embracing the same economic nexus approach and de
273. A higher threshold would likely also be approved by the courts, while a lower
threshold runs the risk of invalidation for an insufficient nexus with the taxing state.
274. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2098.
275. Zach Gladney & Charles Wakefield, ‘Wayfair’: What Are the Practical
Retroactivity Concerns?, BLOOMBERG BNA (July 19, 2018), https://www.bna.com/insightwayfair-practical-n73014477734/.
276. Id.
277. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099.
278. Gladney & Wakefield, supra note 275.
279. McClure, supra note 185, at 277.
280. The make-up of state tax revenue systems is too dissimilar for that to be practical.
For example, a state with no income tax might need a higher sales and use tax rate to
compensate for the revenue not gained through income tax.

2019]

THE WAKE OF WAYFAIR

325

minimis threshold, states could establish a more consistent marketplace for
internet retailers and their customers.281 This uniformity is especially helpful
for states that, unlike South Dakota, are not party to the SSUTA. Given the
costs and administrative challenges of collecting and remitting sales and use
tax across more than 10,000 taxing jurisdictions across the 50 states, failure
to find some common ground could deal a painful, if not fatal, blow to many
internet retailers.
The following is a model provision for the imposition of sales and
use tax on remote internet retailers after Wayfair drafted by the Author with
the foregoing four considerations in mind:
Model: Sales and Use Tax Liability for Out-of-State
Retailers
(a)
Out-of-state retailers will be deemed to have a
substantial nexus with this State if they engage in regular or
systematic solicitation of customers in this State through any
means and either (i) made sales to consumers in this State
from which gross revenue exceeds one hundred thousand
dollars ($100,000) or (ii) completed two hundred (200) or
more separate transactions for the delivery of tangible
personal property, products transferred electronically, or
services into this State during the previous or current twelvemonth period.
(b)
Out-of-state retailers having such substantial nexus
with State as described in subsection (a) of this provision
shall register with the State department of revenue for sales
and use tax purposes and shall collect and remit the
appropriate tax to the Department on sales of tangible
personal property and other taxable items delivered to
consumers in this State.
(c)
Persons who purchase tangible personal property or
other taxable items from any out-of-state retailer as
described in subsection (a) must pay State sales and use tax
to the retailer, unless the sale is otherwise exempt under the
laws of this State.

281. Federal legislation like the Marketplace Fairness Act may also be helpful in setting
more standardized guidelines for remote e-commerce taxation.
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(d)
No obligation to collect and remit the State sales tax
required hereby may be applied retroactively.
The individualized nature of states’ sales and use tax schemes makes
it difficult to offer a singular method of implementing this change. Some
will require statutory changes; others may promulgate rules through the
appropriate regulatory body. The purpose of this model is only to serve as
an illustration of how the economic nexus approach may be implemented in
the future, with its de minimis threshold and new categorization of substantial
nexus. It may provide aid for states seeking to collect sales and use taxes on
remote e-commerce without impeding interstate commerce, should Quill no
longer control the field.
CONCLUSION
The retail landscape is changing. With e-commerce on the rise, it is
increasingly vital that states find ways to innovate and adapt their tax systems
to the contemporary marketplace without hampering the growth of that
marketplace. Following Wayfair, and in the lingering silence of Congress,
states will experience new freedoms in e-commerce taxation as the focus
shifts from physical presence to other, perhaps yet unimagined means of
establishing a substantial nexus. There are now multitudinous options at their
disposal by which to supplement their current revenue sources and adapt to
the changing retail landscape.
It bears mentioning that the ultimate wisdom of imposing sales and
use taxes on e-commerce is tremendously complex and beyond the scope of
this note. Rather, this note is intended to address the impacts of Wayfair,
including those stemming from issues it resolved as well as those it left
unsettled, and to provide guidance for states looking to adapt their tax
schemes to the current environment of e-commerce taxation. As discussed
above, such adaptations should strive to strike a balance between maximizing
revenue and minimizing the burden upon remote retailers. Failure to do so
may irreparably harm the very marketplace states seek to gain advantage
from. Success, however, may serve to finally contemporize internet retail
taxation with today’s commercial reality.

